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-ABSTRACT AND SUBXAXY 
The central  theme of this pape r  is the  development of the  international p r ice  of 
c rude  oil. A sho r t  overview of oil p r ice  h i s6 ry  is followed by a discussion of the  
fac tors  tha t  were responsible f o r  previous, sometimes e r r a t i c ,  changes. W e  con- 
clude that  these factors  are likely t o  maintain t he i r  influence in the  future ,  thus 
giving the  forecasts  of oil p r ices  a high uncertainty. This uncertainty is  reflected 
in several  r epo r t s  containing oil p r ice  proje[ctions. W e  argue,  therefore ,  that  a 
question soieiy about future  oil pr ices  must remain unanswered. Tnis does not 
render  the  effor ts  t o  examine the  future  futile; i t  simpiy means that the  question 
shouid be rephrased.  W e  offer  one possible problem formulation tha t  explicitly 
accounts fo r  the  high uncertainty. This formulation requires  tha t  specific policy 
probiems and options fo r  solving them be  specified before oil p r ices  are projected - 
a condition tha t  does not always hold o r ,  at least ,  that  does not s e e m  to  be  regarded 
as important enougn t o  be  described in many r epo r t s  on oil p r ice  studies. 
PREFACE 
The internationai p r ice  of c rude  oil is one of the  most visibie and most impor- 
tant variables of any energy system. Nonetheless, i ts  future  deveiopment is  highly 
uncertain. Many energy studies explicitly ref lect  this uncertainty, but even those 
tha t  do not impiicit!~ reflect i t  through comparison with o ther  studies. However, i t  
i s  an open question whether t he  theoreticai increase of information concomitant 
with the increase in the  number of oil p r ice  projections has  actually improved the  
pract ical  knowledge of t he  consumers of the  repor t s .  W e  argue  tha t  "inconclusive" 
is a more iikely initiai reaction and have therefore  attempted to ex t r ac t  t he  full 
information content from a collection of oil pr ice  projections. I t  turns  out tha t  this 
information content could be improved if t he  authors  of energy r epo r t s  made partic- 
u la r  effor ts  in this direction. 
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The international p r i c e  of c r u d e  oil i s  one of t h e  most visible and most impor- 
t an t  var iables  of any energy system. Energy planning at many levels i s  crucially 
dependent on t h e  expected f u t u r e  development of c r u d e  oil p r i ces .  The importance 
of oil p r i c e  is f u r t h e r  amplified by t h e  widespread p rac t i ce  of linking t h e  p r ices  of 
o t h e r  fuels t o  it. I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  not surpr is ing t h a t  most energy studies include a 
projection of t h e  international p r i c e  of oil. However, t h e  information gained by 
studying a single r e p o r t  i s  often diminished when unresolvable di f ferences  are 
reveaied by comparing i t  with o t h e r  studies. 
In th is  p a p e r  w e  r e p o r t  a survey of a number of energy studies t h a t  contain 
projections of the  f u t u r e  oii p r i ce .  After a n  introductory overview of t h e  his tory  of 
oil 9 r i c e s  w e  descr ibe  t h e  resu i t s  of a n  international poll on long-term energy pro- 
jections. The responses  t o  this poll inciuaed 61 different  p r o j e c ~ i o n s  of the  c r u d e  
oil p r i c e  f o r  t h e  y e a r  2000. W e  then examine in more detail  some studies t h a t  are 
represen ta t ive  f o r  t h e  range  of a l l  projections.  Finally, we t r y  t o  a raw some con- 
clusions t h a t  may b e  helpful in assessing t h e  significance of a wide range  of dif- 
f e r e n t  crude-oil p r i c e  projections.  
P a r t  of th is  work w a s  done under  a con t rac t  with Planning Consultants Oy ERG 
Ltd., Helsinki, Finiana. 
2 ENERGY PXCZS. C C N S m m C N  AND ECDWOMIC GROWTH 
The causal relationship between oil p r ices  and economic growth is two-way. Oil 
p r ices  a f f ec t  GDP growth and GDP growth determines energy demand, which in t u rn  
influences energy prices.  One of t h e  links between t h e  two is  energy efficiency, 
expressed as t he  amount of energy consumed p e r  unit of GDP. In this section w e  
give an  overview of t h e  history of energy efficiency and discuss t h e  interpiay 
between GDP growth and energy pr ices  tha t  ha s  led t o  t h e  presen t  situation. 
During t h e  las t  two centur ies  overall  energy-use efficiencies have continuously 
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Figure 1. Gnergy Efficiency in t h e  US. 
improved. For  example, Figure 1 snows tha t  t he  amount of energy used t o  genera te  
a doilar of value added in real terms in t he  US decreased on average  about 1% p e r  
y e a r  during t h e  last  100 yea r s  (including t h e  two ab rup t  oil p r i ce  increases  in 1973 
and 1979). Tnese improvements were partially due t o  more efficient ways of energy 
conversion and use, t o  new conservation measures (e.g., be t t e r  housing insulation), 
and aiso t o  a continuous shift  from oia t o  new energy sources.  The latter point is 
i l lustrated by Figure 2, which snows t he  substitution of primary energy sources  ir. 
t h e  US f o r  t he  same time period. 
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Fi,-e 2. Primary Energy Substitution in t he  U.S. 
Thus, although t h e r e  is no doubt t ha t  in t he  long run  oil will slowly be  replaced 
5y al ternat ive energy forms and tha t  the  high oil y r ices  of t he  iast decade have 
reduced oil demand, i t  i s  s t i l i  an  open question as t o  what s h a r e  of this reduction is 
revers ible .  In fact. some of t he  la rges t  energy "savings:' ex7erienced. during r ecen t  
yea r s  have been due t o  t ne  low levei of activity of the more energy-intensive indus- 
t r i es .  such as steei azd. shj3buiiding. Some of tine changes in energy consumption 
and economic pa t te rns  will have a permanent s t ruc tura l  cha rac t e r ,  out  o the r s  will 
be  reversed. when the  world economy recovers .  An important purpose of energy 
projections will be  t o  different ia te  which changes are which. Figure 3 i l lustrates 
tha t  even the  s n o r t e r  term oil consumption variations in t he  OECD countries during 
the  last  decade have been "synchronized" both with t h e  cyclical fluctuations of r ea l  
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Fig?~re  3. O i l  Prices, Consumption, and. GDP Growth. 
GDP and the  oil p r ice  changes. I t  appea r s  t ha t  t he  two major oil p r i ce  increases ,  
the  so-called oil shocks t ha t  occur red  in 1973-74 and 1979-80, entailed, with a lag of 
about one year ,  profound fluctuations in both GDP and oil consumption in t h e  OECD 
countries. The f i r s t  oil p r i ce  increase had caused considerable disruption and, 
before  an  adequate period for complete adjustment has  elapsed, t h e  second increase 
gave anot'ner significant impact. But, more importantly, i t  established expectations 
of rapidiy rising pr ices  in t h e  future.  Consequently, m o s t  oil p r i ce  projections of 
the  las t  decade envisaged high oil p r ice  levels in t h e  future .  
3ese  recent  deveiopments are in s h a r p  cont ras t  t o  t h e  situation p r io r  t o  1973 
when t h e  muitinational oil companies regulated oil p r ices  and supply under t h e  pres-  
su re s  of r igorous competition and the  regime of incrementai production costs. 
Since t h e  production costs were l ow  and even decreasing, especially in t he  Persian 
G-df a r e a ,  t h e  oil p r ices  aiso decreased in constant value terms. Figure 4 shows 
tha t  oil p r ices  decreased continuously from t h e  end of World War I1 to t he  ear ly  
1970s, when t h e  decade of market dominance by OPEC began. Despite t he  sometimes 
disrupted sp i r i t  of unity among member countries,  OPEC managed to r a i s e  pr ices  and 
subsequently, tnrough supply regulation. kept  them from falling to lower levels. 
During this decade of OPEC dominance t h e r e  w a s  a simultaneous change in t h e  
organization of tine international oil market. The market became more open and 
t ransparen t  in t h e  sense t ha t  more transactions passed through t r a d e r s  and spot  
markets tha t  were not contained within t he  major  oil companies. These majors lost 
much of t he i r  control of t he  international market,  but a lso lost w a s  t he i r  stabilizing 
influence on pr ices  through timeiy supply responses t o  demand changes. A t  t h e  
same time, tine hign oii p r i ce  leveis estabiishea by OPEC caused a rapid increase in 
oil proauction in non-OPZC countries (e.g., Mexico), which f u r t h e r  increased t h e  
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Figu,?re 4. History of Oil Pr ices  
flexibility of the internationai oil t rade.  Without the  dominating ro le  of the  majors 
to  control supply and pr ices  in response to  cnanging demand, the  world oil market 
became more similar t o  o the r  international commodity markets,  such as coffee, 
sugar ,  and wheat, in which inventory changes aiso have a strong effect  on prices. In 
fact ,  inventory accumulation as a resul t  of the  f e a r  of rapicily rising pr ices  (or  
acquisition of s t ra teg ic  reserves ,  as i t  is sometimes called) of oil appea r s  to  have 
played a very important ro le  in creat ing a n  excess of demand f o r  oil, thus leading t o  
pr ice  increases. (An impressive example of self-fulfilling expectations.) This inven- 
tory accumulation, perhaps  inadvertently, i s  a n  additional reason f o r  the  sof te r  oil 
markets tha t  have developed during the  last  four  years ,  weakening OPEC dominance. 
After p a r t s  of these inventories were unloaded during 1981-82, the  oil p r ices  
s ta r ted  to  fall in 1983 f o r  the  f i r s t  time in ten years .  In response to  the  sudden 
t h r ea t  of an  impending oil glut, OPEC has now introduced formal production quotas 
f o r  i t s  members in an  attempt t o  limit the  supply. These quotas a r e  not an  easy con- 
s t ra in t  f o r  a l l  oil-producing countries. The financial difficulties of many of them, 
notably Nigeria and Venezuela (and Mexico, which apparently attempts t o  "mirror" 
OPEC strategies  t o  some extent)  can probably be resolved only by increased oil 
production, since these countries must realize cer tain minimal revenues because, 
f o r  them, oil exports  are t h e  only possible way t o  balance the i r  t r ade  deficits. 
Thus, p ressures  appea r  t o  be  s t rong on the  supply side toward increasing produc- 
tion levels and, therefore ,  a lso decreasing pr ices  due t o  lower oil demand. 
W e  have already mentioned that a number of long-term :!structural" changes 
could account f o r  lower oil demand. Tnus, p a r t  of t h e  demand reduction could be  
due to  the  substitution of c rude  oil by o the r  energy sources and another  p z r t  t o  
genuine energy conservation and be t t e r  efficiences of energy end-use. A p a r t  of 
the reductions in the  total  demand f o r  energy, on the  o t h e r  hand, is usually at t r i -  
buted t o  t h e  overall  fall in consumption, due t o  tne  worldwide economic recession. 
Therefore,  a number of alternative mechanisms, ranging from energy substitution 
and conservation t o  pr ice  and income effects,  o r  some combination of them, could 
account f o r  t he  r ecen t  demand reductions f o r  energy in general and crude  oil in 
particular.  
During t h e  last  two yea r s  the  adequate supply of oil and the reduced demand 
have contributed t o  fairly steady energy and oil prices,  but this  stability may b e  
deceptive. For instance, a fu r the r  escalation of hostilities between I ran  and Iraq 
could eventually resul t  in a n  oil supply disruption of unprecedented scale. The 
pr ice  of oil couid then surge,  followed by the  pr ices  of o the r  energy sources.  In t he  
absence of a serious disruption, however, a continued weakness of oil and energy 
prices  is conceivable. In this event, OPEC countries would have t o  absorb  most of 
the  decline in demand by reducing production in an  effor t  t o  stabilize prices.  On the  
o the r  hand, a n  increase in oil demand would cause higher OPEC oil production and 
pr ice  increases.  in this  sense, OPEC represents  the  world's residual source of 
energy, filiing the  deficit o r  absorbing the  surplus in energy supply. Thus, even 
relativeiy smaii increases  in globai energy demand lead t o  ove,rproportional 
increases in OPEC oil demand and, presumably, upward pressures  on oil prices.  The 
r eve r se  of this  phenomenon i s  demonstrated by recent  events, when a 1% decline in 
global energy consumption (between 1979 and 1982) translated into a 40% decline in 
OPEC oil production (see, e. g., [I]). 
Since OPEC apparent ly represents  the  residual supplier of energy at t he  world 
level, t he  pr ice  of OPEC oil provides a re ference  pr ice  not only f o r  o ther  crude-oil 
transactions,  but also f o r  o t h e r  energy sources.  Crude oil represents  about 80% of 
internationally t raded energy and, as such, i ts  p r ice  s e rves  as a marker  f o r  all 
o the r  energy sources t ha t  are t raded internationally (a f te r  quality differentiation 
is accounted for).  Owing t o  t he  cr i t ical  roles  of c rude  oil in t he  global energy sys- 
tem, as both t h e  main and the  residual energy source and the  pr ice  leader ,  fu ture  
oil-price prospects  r ep re sen t  one of t he  most 'important indicators of t he  develop- 
ment of the  whole energy system. 
I t  is  therefore  not surprising tha t  most energy studies and projections deal  
with fu ture  oil prices.  Unfortunately, c rude  oil and energy pr ices  are t rea ted  (and 
repor ted)  quite differently in t he  various studies. The scaie ranges from inferences 
tha t  assumptions on energy pr ices  have occurred  somewhere in t he  analysis t o  
explicit presentations of projected pr ice  t rajector ies .  Because of t he  importance 
of anticipating future pr ice  developments in prudent planning and decision making 
and because c rude  oil pr ices  will be instrumental as an  indicator of o the r  changes 
throughout the  energy system ana the whole economy, t he  objective of this paper  is 
to  assess and compare pr ice  projections published in the  l i terature.  In analyzing 
these projections and the  scenarios on which they are based, i t  is nevertheless very 
important t o  be always aware of the  fact t ha t  the  uncertain prospects  of actual 
future events cannot, even in principle, be overcome o r  predicted by a comparison 
of different projections. Rather ,  projections can help t o  outline the  limits and 
probable ranges of future developments. Furthermore, a comparison of different 
projections and the i r  underlying assumptions offers  t he  possibility of identifying the  
importance of various fac tors  and developments connected with oil p r ice  changes in 
these projections. In o the r  words, t he  s t ruc tu re  and the  na ture  of t he  assumptions 
and/or  t he  model used in projecting oil p r ices  is at least as important as the  actual 
values of the  projected t ra jec tory .  In this review of t he  l i t e ra ture  w e  analyze both 
the  methodology and assumptions, as w e i l  as the resultant pr ice  t rajector ies .  
3 A COLLECTION OF OIL PRICE PROJECTIONS 
A l a rge  collection of long-term oil p r ice  projections is one of t he  resul ts  of the 
International Energy Workshop (IEW), an  institution tha t  regularly polls projections 
of crude oil pr ices ,  economic growth, primary energy consumption and production, 
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Figure 5. Projections of the  Internationai P r i ce  of C n a e  Oil. 
and energy t r ade  [2]. Figure 5 is a summary of the  1983 poll resul ts  on the  interna- 
tional p r ice  of c rude  oil. The f igure is  in the  form of a time se r i e s  of histograms of 
projections with the  medians marked separately.  The units chosen in the  original 
presentation of t he  poi1 resul ts  are index numbers with the  basis 1980 = 100. E e r e  
w e  have added a scale with absolute numbers using an oil p r ice  of f34/bbl fo r  1980. 
The median of the  6 1  independent* poll responses f o r  t he  y e a r  2000 i s  148, 
corresponding t o  an  annual average pr ice  increase (between 1980 and 2000) of 
almost exactly 2%. A more appropr ia te  statistic is t o  calculate t he  average  and the  
variance (5 and s )  of the  logarithms of the  projections (as if they were distributed 
log normally). Doing this and retransforming the  resul ts  yields 139 as an  average  
and the  interval [106,184] f o r  [z - s-;z' + s ] .  
The extreme projections f o r  t he  y e a r  2000 are 62 and 240 (on the  relative 
scale),  corresponding t o  absolute values of $23.6 and $91.2/bbl, respectively, thus 
covering a range of almost 1:4. To understand this wide range  i t  is  natural t o  look 
f o r  a n  explanation of these extreme projections. One of t he  projections f o r  t he  
yea r  2000 tha t  i s  nea r  t he  low end is the  High Demand Case by the  International 
Energy Agency (IEA). I t  represents  a "what if?" case in which the  demand f o r  oil a t  
a given (low) pr ice  is calculated. Since the resuitant oil demand in this  scenario 
exceeds the  projected supplies, t he  oil p r ice  in this IEA scenario i s  more accurately 
a scenario parameter  r a t h e r  than a projection. The projection of 240 (correspond- 
ing t o  a n  annual average  growth rate of 4.4% star t ing from 1980), on the  o the r  side 
of t he  spectrum, is t h e  outcome of a disruption scenario tha t  does not contain an  
inconsistency comparable t o  t h e  one in t he  IEA scenario,  but which considers a disr-  
uption of energy imports, a n  assumption not made by most of t he  o the r  respondents. 
* W e  use the  term "independent" h e r e  quite loosely. All  i t  means at this  point is t ha t  
those responses t ha t  belonged t o  different geographical regions but t o  t he  
s a m e  overall  scenario w e r e  counted only once. 
Star t ing thus from the  extremes may ra i se  the  intuitive expectation that  this 
process  should converge t o  single out the  median (or  any o t h e r  unambiguous) value 
as "the best" projection. However, this comfortabie and easy picture  is grossly dis- 
turbed by t h e  inherent  uncertainty t ha t  surrounds real-worid development. The 
median of t h e  projections i s  only a description of t h e  cu r r en t  thinking of energy 
expe r t s  and i ts  interpretat ion as t h e  most likely future  vaiue would r equ i r e  some 
nontrivial assumptions. The purpose of t he  IEW should not b e  misinterpreted as t o  
mean the  resolution of uncertainty. Rather ,  t he  IEW discussions are meant t o  make 
differences of opinion explicit ,  to heip make scenarios  and assumptions consistent, 
and t o  widen points of view through challenging them with different perspectives.  
This can be called quantification ( r a t h e r  than elimination) of uncertainty. 
4 A SURYE;Y OF ENERGY STUDIES 
Whet'ner one wants t o  ex t r ac t  the  information content of a set of oil p r ice  pro- 
jections by formal statistical methods o r  by d i rec t  discussion, the  question of the  
independence of t h e  individual projections arises.  And although t h e r e  i s  no practi-  
cai,  unambiguous definition of independence, w e  se t  out h e r e  t o  evaluate the 
indepenaence of some oil p r ice  projections in auaiitative terms. To do this w e  could 
only work with those projections tha t  were accompanied by a written r e p o r t  provid- 
ing context and background. This w a s  more restricting than one might have expected 
and s o  w e  use a somewhat different  sample of projections to the one described in the  
previous section. The new sample i s  nei ther  a subset nor  a superset  of t he  projec- 
tions shown above, but t h e r e  is a significant overlap. In any case,  w e  believe tha t  
neither t he  conclusions drawn in this section nor the  ciiscussion below is  influenced 
by using two different samples of oil p r ice  projections. 
Shor t  characterizations of the r epo r t s  w e  used are included in t he  Appendix, in 
which the  abbreviations used in Table 4.1 are defined. Here w e  summarize the  
repor t s '  oil p r ice  projections f o r  the  y e a r  2000 and judgmentally evaluate t he i r  
degree  of independence, dividing them into t h r e e  categories,  i. e. ,  N (for  "no"), M 
(for  "maybe"), and Y (for  "yes"). .We classified as "N" those projections in which i t  
is  explicitly stated tha t  they oriented the i r  projection toward others;  as "Mu those 
wnere the  projection is character ized e i ther  as "expert opinion" o r  as an  assump- 
tion tha t  i s  not aiscussed fur ther ;  and as "Y" where the  projection w a s  repor ted  as 
t he  result of the  application of formal tools. Obviously, w e  do not think tha t  these 
are particularly s t r i c t  c r i t e r i a  f o r  the  determination of independence, but w e  think 
tha t  they se rve  as an adequate working tool. If t he re  i s  a systematic bias in these 
evaluations then i t  is  a shift  t o  t h e  "independentJ' side. In par t icular ,  w e  do not 
think tha t  Odell's arguments [3] concerning the "latter day pessimism" (implying a 
dependence of ail nigh oil p r i ce  projections on a joint source)  can be dismissed. 
! N a m e  (IEW Name) I Method Projection Independence 
CEC 
Chase 
Chevron (CAL) 
Conoco (CON) 
DOE (DOE) 
Eden (CERG) 
EIU 
EMF 
ETA-M (EM) 
GRI (GRI) 
IEA (IEA) 
IET 
Deam 
Odell (CIES) 
World Bank (WBK) 
Assump tion 
Iteration 
Exp. Opinion 
Exp. Opinion 
Exp. Opinion 
Trend Extrapol. 
Qualitative 
Analytical 
Assumption 
Assump tion 
Assumption 
Assumption 
Direct 
Direct 
Take-Over 
Table 4.1. Oil p r ice  projections f o r  t he  yea r  2000 (in 1980 US $) and a judgmental 
evaluation of t he i r  independence. 
Notes f o r  Table 4.1: 
a Authors' quantification of a qualitative projection. 
Reference case only. 
C Estimate f o r  1995. 
- Where oniy relative increases  were given, an 1980 oil p r ice  of $34/bbl w a s  
used as a basis f o r  t h e  calculation of the projected number. 
- For a definition of t he  abbreviations of the  studies see t he  Appendix. 
- IEW names are given in parentheses  where applicable. 
- The ent r ies  in the  column 'lndependence" gives o u r  rough judgmental evalua- 
tion of t he  independence of t he  projections. Y stands f o r  yes, N fo r  no, and M 
f o r  maybe. 
i t  i s  interesting t o  note t h a t  t he  range  of future oil pr ices  covered by the  four  
projections tha t  were character ized as "independent" reaches  from less than half 
t he  cu r r en t  pr ice  level (Odell) t o  well beyond twice the  cu r r en t  level (EMF) thus 
marking the  extreme points of the  overall  range. 
The judgmental c h a r a c t e r  of this evaluation and the  more detailed discussion of 
the  resul ts  beiow notwithstanding, w e  a rgue  that  t he  sparseness  of t he  'YY"s is a n  
important resul t  because, even if one were willing to count all "M"s as independent 
( r a t h e r  than t h e  o t h e r  way round), i t  i s  worth noting tha t  t he  au thors  do  not make 
g rea t  e f for t s  to discuss t he  deg ree  of independence of t he i r  oil p r i ce  projections. * 
Reaaers  may formulate t he i r  own judgment, but w e  a rgue  tha t  i t  would be  optimistic 
to assume tha t  t he  fract ion of independent projections is  higher  than one-half and 
t h e  possibility of i t  being as small as one-fourth is quite definite. 
I t  is c l ea r  t ha t  independence cannot b e  unambiguously measured in o u r  subject 
matter, but  at least  our proxies  are observable. Unfortunately, these  proxies do  
not s epa ra t e  t he  cases clearly.  Take, e. g., t h e  distinction between "result of t he  
application of formal tools" and "assumption". The only r e a l  difference between t h e  
two is t ha t  in t h e  former case t h e  assumptions have an indirect effect  on t h e  resul ts  
whereas they lead direct ly  to i t  in t h e  latter case. This is  i l lustrated by the  World. 
Oil r e p o r t  of t he  Energy Modeling Forum. There t he  projected oil p r ices  are in 
m o s t  cases t h e  resul t  of t he  application of p r ice  react ion functions (which use capa- 
city utilization at time t a s  one of t h e  determinants of percent  change from t to t+ l )  
which, in tu rn ,  contain assumptions about t h e  speed of adjustment. 
The projections labeled as "expert  opinion" were put  into t he  middle category 
mainly because t he i r  origin i s  usually so vague tha t  they could b e  anything from 
compietely dependent to completely indepenaent. Their common f ea tu re  i s  tha t  they 
do  not lend themselves easily to comparative analyses, as t h e  methodologies used to 
der ive  these projections and t h e  assumptions adopted are not descr ibed in enough 
detail  to permit an approximate repetit ion of the  process  tha t  led to t he  resul ts ,  
* 9 e  US Anti-Trust Law p re sc r ibes  tha t  the  U S  oil companiest estimates b e  indepen- 
dent of each o ther .  
thereby identifying which causes led to  which effects. 
Although the World Oil study is represented as only one entry in our  table the  
underlying results are numerous. The EMF entry in Table 4.1 summarizes more than 
100 results of different model runs. Quite obviousiy, this reflects several a reas  of 
uncertainty, both with respect  t o  parameters that  are thought t o  influence the  
future oil price and to  the  magnitude of the  effects caused by these parameters. 
The study clearly distinguishes between the  two and 'quantifies them separately. The 
total range of all results, expressed in 1980 U S  dollars (the original table uses 1981 
dollars), is  30-375. Compared with the  IEW results illustrated in Figure 3.1 the  EMF 
study shows some 20 values higher than the IEW highest, but none that  is lower than 
the lowest IEW projection. In particular,  not even the  "optimistic" EMF scenario 
shows a vaiue comparable, say, t o  Odell's projections. In this connection it  is 
interesting to note that  the  range of EMF'S "optimistic" oil prices falls completely 
within the  range of the  "reference" cases. (However, the  results of those two 
models that  yielded the lowest reference projections are not reported in the  sum- 
m a r y  of the  optimistic scenario.) A possible expianation fo r  this r a t h e r  high bound 
f o r  optimism could lie in the  parameters for  the  price reaction functions that  set 
limits to downwarci adjustments. Clearly, if these parameters a r e  set very tightly 
their  price reducing effect is  easily offset by o ther  variables (such as trends), thus 
causing the  models t o  project price increases even in times of underutilized capa- 
city. 
5 DISCUSSION 
From the  discussion in t he  previous section w e  conclude tha t  i t  would be  highly 
speculative t o  assume tha t  a l a rge  sample of oil p r ice  projections represents  the  
probable distribution of fu ture  oil prices.  The interdependence of t he  single pro- 
jections is simply too high o r ,  at least,  the i r  independence is not demonstrable. We 
have mentioned Odell's argument [3] tha t  most projections a r e ,  indeed, dependent on 
each o the r  with the  effect,  expressed in statistical language, t ha t  t he i r  average  is 
too high. B e  this as i t  may, t he  influence of statistical dependence on the  variance 
is  much c l ea re r ,  i. e., in t he  case  of dependence the  sample variance is usually 
reduced. In o u r  subject  matter  this  implies tha t  t he  "actual" distribution of 
independent oil p r i ce  forecasts  would cover  a n  even wider range  than the  already 
wide span of t he  projections presented here .  One sound conclusion tha t  can b e  
drawn from all this  is tha t  i t  does not make much sense t o  think of a unique value (or  
even a narrow range)  when working with uncertain prospects,  such as fu ture  oil 
prices.  
A s  a general remark. w e  note that ,  despite t he  convenience of using terms and 
concepts of probability theory f o r  some purposes, i t  would be  inadmissible t o  use a 
set of projections as a representat ion of a probability function in a more rigorous 
way. Apart from the  problem of dependence t h e r e  is t he  problem tha t  t he  premises 
of probability theory do not apply in an  obvious way t o  forecasts  and projections. 
This has been recognized by psychologists who have the re fo re  introduced t h e  con- 
cept  of "judgmental probability". This concept may work as a tool f o r  individual 
decision making, but w e  think tha t  the  low quaiity of individual probability judgment 
observed by psychologists (see,  e. g., [4] f o r  a number of illustrations), should be  a 
warning against readiiy using a "collective-judgmental probability" as if it were as 
well defined a s ,  say, Brownian motion. Refraining from doing s o  will also help t o  
avoid futile discussions as to  whether a forecast  w a s  r ight  under t he  circumstances 
and the  real-world events took a low-probability course o r  whether the  actual out- 
come w a s  a reasonably likely outcome of a different model. 
Having discussed so  f a r  mainly the  drawbacks, the  r eade r  may wonder whether 
w e  see any usefulness in making a comparative study of oil p r i ce  projections. W e  
certainly do, and by  playing down the  importance of rigorous tools w e  emphasize the  
ro le  of judgment, which i s  g r e a t e r  than many r epor t s  lead the i r  r e a d e r s  t o  believe. 
And since judgment is inherently subjective w e  think tha t  oil p r ice  (and many o ther )  
forecasts  ought t o  be  formulated in a way tha t  leaves room f o r  t he  judgment.of the  
users  of these forecasts.  Moreover, where t h e r e  is any interaction between a n  
analyst and a decision maker, i t  seems natural f o r  the  latter to be  at t he  top of the  
"judgmental hierarchy". (In t he  next section w e  describe a scheme in which this 
proposal is incorporated.) This implies t ha t  both the  analyst and the  decision maker 
have (in general different) judgmental probability distributions. The reason why i t  
is  t he  decision maker whose judgment has  to  guide the  analysis (maybe more so  than 
the  analysis guiding the  decision maker) lies in t he  f ac t  tha t  the  decision maker is 
/ 
(politicaily) responsible f o r  his decision, which means tha t  i t  is he  who has t o  c a r y  
the  burden of explaining decisions and the i r  consequences; and even if the  impossi- 
ble were, in fact ,  possible and one couid formalize all these aspects  of decision maic- 
ing and solve the  problem analytically i t  seems hard  t o  imagine that  the  decision 
makers would enjoy the  idea of being essentially replaced by computer models. 
Thus, w e  see the  principal usefulness of projections in the i r  potential t o  edu- 
ca t e  the  judgment of those who use them. Unfortunately, w e  have often observed 
that  a r epo r t  does not fully exploit this potential. There can be many reasons f o r  
this,  but a fundamental and recur r ing  one is an  imbalance that  overemphasizes the  
rigorous p a r t  of an analysis a t  t he  expense of a discussion of t he  many instances 
where judgment has  played a role.  I t  would certainly increase t he  usefulness of 
r e p o r t s  if they described t h e  purpose f o r  which an oil p r i ce  projection w a s  made 
(thus permitting, at least ,  a guess as to t he  kind of judgment t ha t  w a s  made) and if a 
statement of t he  resu l t s  included at least some r e f e r ence  t o  t he  basic assumptions 
and the i r  causal connection with t he  results.  
6 DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAtNTY 
Thus f a r  w e  have t r i ed  to look at a collection of oil p r i ce  projections in a way 
tha t  resolves  whatever initial confusion may occur  in response t o  a widely sca t te red  
set of point projections. But w e  think tha t  this confusion will be  more permanent if 
mereiy an  answer to a simple numeecal  question i s  sought. This is  because t h e  
intrinsic uncertainties of t h e  problem rende r  nei ther  t he  question no r  any single 
answer appropriate .  And even if one settles f o r  an  answer consisting of a (reason- 
ably narrow) range of oil pr ices ,  i t  i s  hard  t o  believe t ha t  a sat isfactory answer 
could be  obtained. W e  a rgue  tha t  t h e  question about fu ture  oil p r ices  makes sense 
only if a par t icu la r  answer i s  evaluated in terms of i t s  consequences f o r  a decision 
problem. Here  w e  r e t u r n  to o u r  statement of the  previous section tha t  i t  should be  
t he  decision maker whose judgment is t he  ultimate cr i ter ion,  and we presen t  now a 
framework tha t  contains a formal problem description of decision making under  
uncertainty and a cent ra l  r o l e  f o r  a set of diverging projections. Accordingly, t he  
problem is: 
optimize F(D,S) 
where: F is a n  multidimensional function; i ts elements are "consequences" o r  "out- 
comes:' 
D is a vector  of (mutually exclusive) decisions 
S is a vector  of (mutually exclusive) states-of-the-world 
In words: The problem is to depict a decision (di) tha t  will lead t o  an "optimal" set of 
outcomes tF(di, s l ) ,  ..., F(di , s, ) 1. (In practice,  t he  term "optimal" should be  
replaced by the  more precise  "judgmentally optimal" t o  indicate tha t  judgmental 
probabilities are combined with a judgmental trade-off between the  individual out- 
comes - and to d e t e r  analysts from attempting to  solve the  decision problem analyti- 
cally .) Since F is itself a vector ,  the problem is t o  compare the  matrices Ifl(S,D) j, 
... Ifk(S,D)] of consequences and states-of-the-world tha t  are indexed by the  deci- 
sions considered. (A typicai cr i ter ion applied t o  this kind of probiem is  a n  
"insurance" s t rategy aiming a t  a minimization of maximum damage o r  "regret".) 
Tackling the  problem described by this paradigm therefore  involves t he  follow- 
ing steps: 
1. Selection of t he  decisions t o  be  considered. 
2. Selection of t he  states-of-the-world t o  b e  considered. 
3. Selection of t he  consequences t o  be  considered. 
4. Construction of a mapping (model) F(D 3 ) .  
Step 1 falls within the  domain of the  decision makers. And as much as studies 
a r e  sometimes called academic when they somehow neglect the  problem of remaining 
consistent with the  real world. i t  must b e  equally said tha t  decision makers often 
neglect t o  supply analysts with the  decisions at stake.  (Wildavsky and Tenenbaum's 
book [5 ]  on the  oil and gas r e se rve  estimates of t he  US describes  a n  impressive case  
in point.) Many r epor t s  do ref lect  this lack of "reference decisions", but this is not 
always perceived as a grave  deficiency and is sometimes compensated f o r  by the  
formulation of hypothetical decision alternatives.  However, the  overestimation of 
the power of analytical tools maizes the absence of concreLeiy formuiatea decisions 
appea r  less serious. 
Step 2, t he  seiection of a representat ive set of states-of-the-world, is the  s tage 
in which a collection of projections, such as those discussed in this paper ,  can be  of 
significant use. Moreover, t he  wide range  covered by such a collection becomes a 
quite natural feature,  reflecting the  inherent uncertainty of t h e  problem. In o u r  
paradigm, this  s tep  i s  a joint e f for t  of decision maker and analyst, probably engag- 
ing the  l a t t e r  more than the  former. 
S tep  3, t he  selection of a representat ive set of consequences, is again a joint 
task of decision maker and analyst, this  time probably engaging t h e  former more 
than the  la t te r .  
Step 4,  t he  construction of a model tha t  incorporates  the  resul ts  of t he  previ- 
ous th ree  s teps,  is t he  natural domain of t he  analyst. However, this aomain ought t o  
be much more invaded by decision makers (mainly through the i r  involvement in t he  
basic s teps)  than is usual. What t he  participation of the  decision maker in the 
modeling p a r t  amounts t o  i s  a joint determination of the'moael size. Choosing the  
best size of a model requi res  a trade-off between the  clar i ty  of t he  modeling process  
(which favors  smaller models) and the  amount of information contained in the  model 
output (which, taking quantity as a cri ter ion,  favors  l a rge r  models). This trade-off 
is by no means obvious t o  resolve. However, w e  think tha t  in cases where the  
interaction between modelers and decision makers is weak, i t  is  all  too often 
resolved with a bias toward l a r g e r  models. The paradigm described h e r e  i s  con- 
sistent with the  s t rategy "as s m a l l  as possible" f o r  the  determination of t he  
appropriate  model size. By this  w e  mean that  (at least  t he  f i rs t )  selection of model 
size should yield the  smallest model tha t  gives any meaningful answer t o  the  problem 
a t  hand. 
The activities and the  resul ts  of all s teps a r e ,  of course,  intertwined with all 
o the r  s teps,  making the  whole process  a repetit ive procedure. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this r epo r t  we have summarized the  oil pr ice projections of a number of 
r epo r t s  and we have t r ied  to summarize and reconcile the possible reasons f o r  the  
wiae range spannea by these projections. Eventually, we have come to recognize 
the  potential usefulness of such a variety of resul ts  which had not been s o  obvious 
at the  outset. This usefuiness becomes explicit if t he  spectrum of different oil p r ice  
projections is considered in t he  context of decision making under uncertainty. How- 
eve r ,  t he  authors  of oil p r ice  projections would have t o  provide more information 
about the  underlying assumptions and objectives if t he i r  r epo r t s  are t o  be  of max- 
imum usefulness f o r  this purpose. This can be done by distributing the  emphasis of a 
study more evenly between scientific r igor  and real-world uncertainty. If model 
resul ts  are qualified by a characterization of the  uncertainty surrounding them and 
if they a r e  explained in terms of thL underlying assumptions, then users  of t he  
results,  in par t icular  decision makers, can compare these assumptions with the i r  
own, and then estimate what difference in the  resul t  they would .make. If authors  
wanted to  go even fu r the r ,  they could also make an  attempt t o  explain why differing 
results,  obtained by o thers ,  are different from the i r  own findings. This would signi- 
ficantly increase t h e  usability of a r epo r t  fo r  t he  soiution of a probiem described 
by o u r  paradigm. Although this purpose is not necessariiy what authors  have in 
mind, w e  think nevertheless that our conclusions are  worthy of some deliberation by 
authors of forthcoming reports on energy studies. 
APPENDIX 
This appendix contains descriptions of the studies reviewed for the discussion 
in Section 4 of this paper in a unified format. It also contains the abbreviations of 
the studies by which they are  referred to in the main text. 
STUDY NAJllEs Energy Scenarios Up to ulaa EUR 20) 
ABBREXATION: CEC 
REFERENCE: Informal presentation by Chr. Waeterloos (DG XVII, CEC, Brussels) at 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, November 1982 (61. 
APPROACH: Scenario writing. 
(a) Methodology: Model of final energy demand in physical terms (MEDEE-3) 
and a linear programming supply model (EFOM 12C). 
(b) Base Year: 1980. 
(c) Assumptions: Three scenarios: 'Tree Competition", 'international 
Cooperation", and "European Common Market". 
(d) Results: Not yet available in final form. 
MAIN OBJECTIVE: Review of energy policy development in the Community and its 
member states. 
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL COVER- European Community, 1980-2000. 
PAEZT OF ENERGY SYSTEM CONSIDERED: Primary to final energy; connection with 
economy. 
PRICE PROJECTIONS: Oil prices in 2000 between $30 and $33/bbl (1981 prices). 
COMXENTS: This review is based on a repor t  of a study in its design phase. 
STUDY NAME: The Energy Outlook Through 2000, a study conducted by the  Energy 
Economics Division. 
ABBREVIATION: Chase 
REFERENCE: The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., March 1983 [7] .  
APPROACH: Three sets if oil price forecasts were developed, i. e., high, low, and 
best estimate. 
(a) Methodology: Oil price, oil demand, petroleum industry, and OPEC financial 
pressure models are linked t o  energy demand and coal demand models, which 
are primary tools f o r  the  iterative long-term forecasts. 
(b) Base Year: 1980/82. 
(c) Assumptions: A model set is  used in an  iterative mode starting with an oil 
price assumption. After iterations natural gas and coal prices can be deter- 
mined on the  basis of crude oil prices. Total energy consumption depends on 
GDP projections via energy price/GDP elasticities, which are estimated f o r  the  
base year  1980. 
(d) Results:  Provides detailed forecasts of the  economic growth and energy 
consumption (based on analysis of supply and demand source) under th ree  dif- 
ferent  scenarios of future oil prices. 
BUN OBJECTIVE: To analyze major issues affecting the  outlook f o r  OPEC oil prices 
as the  focal point of the  study, which examines the  outlook f o r  the  supply, 
demand, and prices of energy in the  market economies. 
SPATIAL AND TE3iPOBCLL COYER From 1980-2000. The world, divided into 42 
regions. 
PART OF ENERGY SYSTEM CONSIDERED: Whole energy system starting with pri- 
mary energy and resources going t o  secondary energy sources and fuel 
demand. 
PRICE PROJECTIONS: 
World Crude Oil Pr ice  Forecast (1981 US%/bbl) 
Year Low 
1980 (actual) - 
1985 24.35 
1990 31.00 
2000 40.00 
Best Estimate 
34.06 
31.60 
35.00 
43.00 
High 
- 
32.25 
40.00 
46.00 
COKMEXTS: This is  a typical independent derivation of oil pr ice  projections as 
described in the  main text. Moreover, the  derivation of these projections w a s  a 
central  reason f o r  undertaking the  study. 
STUDY NAME: World Energy Outlook, June 1983 
AEBEEVIATION: Chevron (CAI,) 
REFERENCE: Standard Oil Company of California (CHEVRON) [a]. 
APPROACH: Appears t o  b e  based on expe r t  opinion and likely trends, but t h e r e  is  
no r e fe rence  t o  formal m o d e l s  tha t  have been used in t h e  study. 
(a) Methodology: Based on r ecen t  t rends and events. The most likely fu ture  
developments are evaluated using t h e  information on production capacities, 
etc. 
(b) Base Year: 1982. 
(c) Assumptions: Substantial economic growth throughout t h e  world (between 3 
and 5% p e r  year )  without excessive energy demand increases. 
(d) Results: World energy consumption in t he  yea r  2000, according t o  energy 
source  and expected oil pr ices .  Also world demand f o r  refining. 
MAIN OBJXCTIYE: To outline t h e  energy and especially oil industry's prospects  up 
to t h e  y e a r  2000. 
SPATIBL BND TEMPORAL COVER- The market economies with special emphasis on 
the  US. . The temporal scope is  divided into short-term prospects  (up t o  1985) 
and long-term t r ends  (up t o  2000). 
PART OF ENERGY SYSTEM CONSIDEEED: Total energy consumption and conse- 
quent demands and production of various energy sources,  with emphasis on oil 
supply, refining capacity,  synthetic fuels production, and crude  oil prices.  
PRICE PROJECTIONS: Crude oil p r ices  under l i t t le upward pressure  until demand 
r i s e s  in t h e  mid-1990s. OPEC supplies nearly half until 2000. Thus, oil p r ices  
wil l  remain f la t  in t h e  1980s and will r i s e  slowly in t h e  1990s reaching a range  
of $35-50/bbl (1983 dollars). Gas and coal will b e  pr iced accordingly t o  b e  
competitive with equivalent oil products. 
COHMENTS: The format of this  publication is charac te r i s t ic  f o r  those r e p o r t s  t ha t  
are labeled "expert opinion" in t he  main text.  
STUDY NAME: World Energy Outlook Through 2000 
A B B ~ T I O N :  Conoco (CON) 
REFEEENCE: CONOCO, Stamford, USA, April 1983 [9). 
APPROACH: Trend extrapolation to produce one forecast of future energy deveiop- 
ments. 
(a) Methodology: Undocumented econometric models of the  relations between 
oil price, demand, and GDP. Judgment apparently plays a considerable role. 
(b) Base Year: 1981/82. 
(c) Assumptions: N o  explicit assumptions are reported. Since an econometric 
model is  used the  number of assumptions (not considering those in 
methodology-related fields, like the  form of the  equations for which the  param- 
eters are estimated) is small.  
(d) Results: Projections of primary energy demand fo r  all market economies 
together and the  US separately. 
MAIN OBJECTIVE: The conclusions reported are policy implications fo r  the  US. 
Presumably, o ther  objectives were behind the  study as wel l .  
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL COYER Market economies, 1980-2000, conclusions fo r  
the  US. 
PART OF EKeEGY SYSTEM CONSIDERED: A l l  primary energy. 
PRICE PROJECTIONS: Qualitative; constant or even decreasing real oil prices f o r  
several years, slight real increase thereafter .  
COXHENTS: Another example of the  "expert opinion1'-type of reports .  
STUDY NAME: S 8 2  AnnuaL Energy OILtlook w i t h  Rejections to S90 
ABBREVIATION: DOE (DOE) 
REFERENCE: US Department of Energymnergy Information Administration, Wash- 
ington, DC, April 1983, DOE/EIA-0383 (82) (101. 
APPROACH: Projection of energy production, consumption, and price in the  US and 
on international energy markets. 
(a) Methodology: Explicit projections and analysis of the  domestic and interna- 
tional energy markets a r e  presented through 1990; they a r e  apparently based 
on trend analysis and exper t  opinion. 
(b) Base Year: 1980/81. 
(c) Assumptions: The world oil price will depend on changes in the  oil market 
(i.e., supply and demand); o ther  energy prices are apparently linked to the  oil 
price. 
(d) Results:  Three oil price projections, the  middle one being described as 
"most realistic", the  lower and upper one as safety margins. Based on the  mid- 
dle projection, prim- energy and oil balances, and economic growth rates 
are given. 
MAIN OBJECTIVE: N o  apparent single objective; DOE publishes i ts  projections as a 
service. In general, this r epor t  investigates possible energy futures f o r  the  
US in the  context of all market economies as par t  (Volume 3) of the  AnnuaL 
Report to Congress. 
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL COVER- Time frame: present to 1990/2000; The energy 
prospects of the  US and the  market economies as a whole are covered. 
PART OF ENERGY SYSTEM CONSIDEaED: Oi l  production, price development, pri- 
mary energy demand, and consumption. 
PRICE PROJECTIONS: 
World Oil Prices in 1982 $/bbl 
Low Middle High 
1980 39.32 39.32 39.32 
1982 33.59 33.59 33.59 
1985 21.00 25.00 34.00 
1990 28.00 37.00 48.00 
COMliENTS: A hypothetical oil disruption scenario is  also analyzed in the  report .  
The calculated consequences on oil supply and price are compared with the  
most probable, middle price, and supply alternative. The major pa r t  of the  
r epor t  deals with US domestic prospects. The methodology and the  general 
approach are not described in much detail. 
STUDY NAME: Energy Projections to the Year 2000 
ILBBEZEMATION: 'DOE (DOE) 
REFERENCE: US Department of Energy/Division of Analytical Services, Washing- 
ton, DC, August 1982, DOE/DE-0029/1 [Ill. 
APPROACH: Market approach given OPEC's future pricing behavior. 
(a) Methodology: Three econometric models are used: oil market simulation, 
OECD energy demand model, and non-OPEC demand model. 
(b) Ba~se Year: 1981. 
(c) Assumptions: Prices remain constant in nominal dollars in 1982 and thus 
grow slightly slower than inflation. 
(d) Results: Economic recovery is assured a f t e r  1982. Provided a variety of 
scenarios in which oil prices and economic growth are varied over a wide 
range. 
MAIN OBJECTIVE: (With respect  to non-US prospects.) World oil market scenarios 
try to  reflect uncertainty, from a US vantage point, regarding world oil price, 
total primary energy consumption, and oil consumption in particular. 
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL COVER- World, with special emphasis on OPEC behavior 
(US, other OECD, OPEC, rest of market economies, CPE). Historical: 1980, 
1981; projected: 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000. . 
PART OF ENERGY SYSTE3I CONSEDERED: Primary energy including oil, coal, gas, 
nuclear, renewables/other, with special emphasis on the world oil price. 
PRICE PROJECTIONS: 
Three Basic Price Scenarios (in 1981 $/bbl) 
1980 1981 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Low 37.0 37.0 27.5 31.5 41.0 51.0 
prices 
Mid-range 37.0 37.0 32.5 42.5 53.5 62.0 
prices 
High 37.0 37.0 37.0 57.0 71.0 74.0 
prices 
COMMENTS: The assumptions are clearly documented. However, the  methodology 
is not described to the degree of detail that enables the  reader  to appreciate 
the linking between assumptions and results. I t  appears that  the  prices are 
determined by the assumed OPEC behavior in the oil market simulation model. 
STUDY NAME: World Energy Outlook to 2020 
ABBREVLATION: Eden (CERG ) 
REFERENCE: Richard Eden et aL., Energy Research Group, Department of Physics, 
Cavendish Laboratory, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 OHE, U.K., June 
1983 [12]. 
APPROACH: Trend projections; scenario writing. 
(a) MethodoLogy: "Supply-demand integration" - iterative balancing of demand 
and supply projections, including consistency checks and feedback. 
(b) Barse Year: 1980, 1983 (not the same for all variables). 
(e) Assumptions: Main scenario, economic growth: 2.7% per  annwn (1980- 
2000). 2.4% per  annwn (2000-2020). 
(d) Results: Dominating role of oil to continue through 2020; investments in 
new energy forms crucial. Procedural result: four consistent scenarios. Main 
scenario variable: GNP growth patterns. 
MAIN OB~CTZYE: To investigate the investment problems arising from a transition 
away from oil. 
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL COVER Market economies, disaggregated into nine 
regions; 1980-2020. 
PART. OF ENERGY SYSTEM CONSIDERED: Primary energy,. emphasis on oil; 
demand analysis disaggregated into economic sectors. 
PRICE PROJECTIONS: Projected oil price in the year 2000: $40-60/bbl (1980 dol- 
lars). 
COMMENTS: Assumptions stay deliberately near the consensus of energy analysts, 
apparently for  the purpose of exploring "common ground". The procedure 
leading to the reported results do not appear to be repeatable for  readers. 
STUDY NAME: P r i z  de Revtent des Energies de Substitution: Elements de Stra- 
tegie pour u n  Group Petrolier (Cost Prices f ir  Substitution Energy: Stra- 
tegy Elements for a n  Oil Company). 
ABBREXATION: IFP 
BEFERENCE: A. Brion, Seminaire i.f.p., Nice (France), March 1981 [13]. 
APPROACH: Analysis and estimation of cost data fo r  different energy chains. 
(a) Methodology: D a t a  collection and return-on-investment calculations. 
(6) Base Year: 1980. 
(c) Assumptiohs: 12 X p e r  annurn return on invested capital for  nonelectric, 
9 X fo r  electric power plants. 
(d) Results: Investments ought to at least double if the stability of the non- 
OPEC energy production situation is to be achieved. 
IUXN OBJECTIVE: To establish a basis for  decisions on strategic investments by an 
oil company (TOTAL). 
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL COYEE: With regard to the origins: global, elsewhere: 
France; the immediate future. 
PART OF ENERGY SYSTEM CONSIDERED: Primary energy (oil, gas, coal, 
nuclear). 
PRICE PROJECTIONS: Derivation of CIF costs of various fuels. To estimate the  
potential profitability of their  production, the average annual growth rate of 
the international oil price is assumed to be 3.5%. 
COMMENTS: Not directly a study on the future oil prices which, however, play a 
crucial role in application of the results. Also, the prospective costs of oil 
competitors have an influence on future oil prices. 
STUDY NAXJZ: OPEC and the World Oil Outlook 
ABBREVIATION: EIU 
REFERENCE: The Economist Intelligence Unit, February 1983, Special Report No. 
140, by B. Mossavar-Rahmani and F. Fesharaki [I]. 
APPROACH: Informal scenario about the  nature of demand for  OPEC oil in relation 
to global economic growth. 
(a) Methodology: Assessment of the market "rules" by a former member of 
OPEC ministerial conferences. 
(b) Base Year: 1981. 
(c) Assumptions: None in the  usual sense of the word. A hypothesis is formed 
on the basis of observations. 
(d) Results: The same forces tha t  drove down demand for  OPEC oil in the  early 
1980s will probably drive i t  back up over the  next three  years because OPEC is 
the world's "swing producer" of crude oil, which multiplies any percentage of 
change in global oil consumption into a much higher percentage change of 
OPEC's oil production. 
HAIN OBJECTIVE: To analyze short- to mediurn-term developments of the world oil 
market. 
SPATIAL ANTJ TEMPORAL COVER- World demand fo r  oil and OPEC production, 
scenario for  1985-1990. 
PART OF ENEEGY SYSTEM CONSIDERED: OPEC production capacity and world 
demand for  OPEC oil. 
PRICE PROJECTIONS: Only qualitative estimates are given, with the  conclusion 
that  the  volatile mixture of oil and politics will lead again to a disruption of 
supplies and higher prices (and fur ther  oscillations). 
COMMENTS: No quantitative forecasts are given. However, the m e r e  description 
of the so-called "OPEC multiplier" amounts to a projection of further  oscilla- 
tions of the  future oil 
STUDY NAME: World Oil, Summary Report 
ABBREVIATION: EMF 
REFERENCE: Energy Modeling Forum (EMF), Stanford University, Stanford, USA, 
February 1982 [14]. 
APPROACH: 'Tooling" of different models: a standardized set of input data is  used 
by different models, the  results of which are then compared. 
(a) Methodology: Obviously, different methods are used by the  different 
models. Many, however, use price reaction functions to determine oil prices. 
(71) Base Year: 1980 (81). 
(c) Assumptions: The standard set of input data consist of 12  scenarios on 
economic growth, price elasticities, OPEC production capacities, and o ther  
variables. These 12  scenarios are used to define input data fo r  the  ten models 
used. 
(d) Results: Future oil prices are highly uncertain, but the re  is  an unmistak- 
able upward trend. 
MAIN OBJECTIYE: To project the  possible future evolution of the  "world" (only the  
market economies are considered) oil market under a range of plausible situa- 
tions. 
SPATIAL AND TEXPORAL COYER- Market economies, 1980-2000. 
PART OF ENERGY SYSTEX CONSIDEBED: Crude oil as primary energy c a r r i e r  
and unspecified "backstops". 
PRICE PROJECTIONS: The 2000 oil price range for t he  reference case i s  $42- 
90/bbl (1981 dollars), dependent on the model. In the  "disruption-low demand 
elasticity" scenario, oil prices go as high as $417/bbl (1981 dollars). 
COMXEXI'S: The EMF study examines many variables tha t  influence future oil 
prices and assesses their  impacts separately, thus distinguishing between the  
uncertainties of the  variables themselves and the  uncertain effects of the i r  
change. The overall resul t  i s  a large number of "point forecasts1', with no 
unambiguous pattern o the r  than tha t  practically all of them represent  an 
increase of t h e  real price of oil. 
STUDY NAkU3: ETA-MACRO: A User's Guide 
ABBREVIATION: ETA-M (EM) 
REFERENCE: EA-1724 Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, February 1981 
[151. 
APPROACH: A combination of a macroeconomic growth model and a process analysis 
fo r  energy technology assessment. 
(a) Methodology: The market economy is simulated over time. Energy supply. 
demand, and prices are matched through a dynamic linear programming model. 
(b) Base Year: 1980. 
(c) Assumptions: Potential GNP growth, elasticity of energy demand substitu- 
tion, price of imported oil, data on energy conversion technologies, and availa- 
bility of natural resources. 
(d) ResuLts: Realized G N P  growth, energy demand, and energy supply by fuel. 
MAIN OBJECTIVE: Check the  logical consistency of competing assumptions about 
energy futures. 
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL COYER- 1980-2000; Canada; China. (See also the  comment 
below. ) 
PART OF ENERGY SYSTEM CONSIDERED: All primary energy. 
PRICE PROJECTIONS: $46-53/bbl (1980 dollars) f o r  the oil price in the year 2000. 
COMMENTS: This description re fe r s  to the user's guide of a model that can be 
applied to a variety of geographical regions and fo r  a variety of assumptions. 
The figures reported in this paper r e f e r  to a run of ETA-MACRO for  Canada by 
J.S. Rogers and T.F. Wilson (University of Toronto) and to  ETA-MACRO Projec- 
t i o n s  par China  by A.S. Manne, November 1982. 
STUDY NAXE: The FLcture of Oil: A ReevaLuation 
ABBREXUTION: Odell (CIES) 
REFERENCE: K.E. Rosing and P.R. Odell, Eurices Paper  nr. 83-lA, Erasmus 
Universiteit Rotterdam, 1983 131. 
APPROACH: Pre-1973 estimates of the then-economic oil reserves and contem- 
porary oil demand estimates are combined. 
(a) Methodology: Determination of 'long-run supply prices" a s  a function of 
cumulative oil consumption. 
(b) Base Year: 1982/83. 
(c) Assumptions: The rapid growth of pre-1972 oil consumption w a s  based on 
unique conditions. 
(d) Results: There is  growth potential fo r  the  global oil industry until at least 
2015. 
MAIN OBJECTlVEk To show that  the  near-consensus view that  oil resources are 
seriously limited i s  too pessimistic and inappropriate. 
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL COVEB: World, 1948-2080. 
PART OF ENEEGY SYSTEX CONSIDEBED: Conventional and unconventional oil. 
PRICE PROJECTIONS: In the  main scenario the oil price is projected to be below 
$25/bbl (1980 dollars) in the  year  2000. 
COMlQZNTS: This study represents  a '%hereticaln view of the  future of oil, backed 
with extensive reasoning. I t  makes one wonder why none of the  more than 100 
projections by the  EMT (which can be viewed as representing the  "conventional 
wisdom") comes anywhere near  the  Odell/Rosing scenario. I t  would s e e m  most 
interesting to investigate this discrepancy in more detail. 
STUDY NAHE: The Outlook for Primary  Commodities 
ABBREVTATION: World Bank (WBK) 
REFERENCE: World Bank Staff Commodity Working Paper  Number 9. The World 
Bank, Washington, DC, U.S.A., January 1983 [16]. 
APPROACH: Global energy demand and supply are projected by country and/or by 
region. A world market price of primary commodities links the  models fo r  the 
countries/regions. Prices a r e  the  result of a balancing procedure of demand 
and supply equations. 
(a) Methodology: Econometric models fo r  each country/region with a common 
structure,  including a supply block, a demand block, and an inventory demand 
equation, normalized on price. Longer-term prices are derived in a less for- 
malized way. 
(b) Base-Year: Historical data up t o  1982. 
(c) Assumptions: Competitive conditions, i. e., utility maximization on the  
demand side and profit maximization on the  supply side. 
(d) Results: Short- and long-term price outlooks f o r  major commodities, 
including energy. Quantities are also derived. 
MAIN OBJECTIVE: The study is mainly designed to help estimate future balances of 
payments and appraise investment prospects. 
SPATIAL AND TEWOEAL COYEE- Whole world, disaggregated into 
countries/regions, which are grouped into industrialized, centrally planned, 
and developing regions. Time horizon: 1995. 
PART OF ENERGY SYSTEM CONSIDERED: Energy demand (including structural  
changes and conservation and rate of economic growth), production capacities 
of each major energy source (oil. coal, gas, nuclear, hydro). 
PRICE PBOJgCTIONS: 
Price  (in 1981 $/bbl) 
COMMENTS: A large number of variables interacting in a system not smaller than 
the  world economy are estimated, yielding a single projection. This has the  vir- 
tue of describing a consistent picture, but questions ar i se  as t o  the  sensitivity 
of the  results and the i r  uncertainty range. 
STUDY NAME The Energy  Trans i t ion  in Developing Countries  
ABBREYIATION: World Bank (WBK) 
REFEBENCE: The World Bank, August 1983, Washington, DC [I71 
APPROACH: Base year 1980 with historical data fo r  1970. Also, some references 
are made t o  the  actual 1982 situation. The methodology is not described expli- 
citly, but i t  is stated that  energy supply and demand prices do depend on the  
future pace of world economic growth. 
(a) Methodology: Projections are obviously based on scenarios of future 
economic development and o ther  factors  determining energy prices and con- 
sumption, but no reference is  made as to whether formal models were used. 
(b) Barse Year: 1980. 
(c) Assumptions: A major assumption is  that  the  current  softening of oil prices 
will not cause any fundamental changes in the  long-run trend of rising energy 
prices. 
(d) ResuLts: Primary energy consumption scenarios by energy source with a 
discussion of possible policy and price consequences. 
MAIN OBJECTIYE: To examine strategic issues concerning the  assurance of 
economic growth and development, despite higher costs of energy, mainly from 
a developing country's perspective. 
SPATIAL AND TEHPORAL COYER- The repor t  deals with developing countries, 
while Chapter 1 gives the  global energy outlook. The spatial disaggregation of 
the  world is  limited t o  developing countries and the  rest of the  world. The time 
horizon is  1995. 
PART OF ENERGY SrSTEP CONSIDEBED: Only primary energy consumption is 
considered explicitly and is  projected t o  grow at 2.3% p e r  year  during the  
1980-1995 period, with the  oil sha re  decreasing and the  sha re  of coal and 
nuclear power increasing. 
PRICE PROJECTIONS: The repor t  discusses the  considerable uncertainty about 
the  precise rate of price increases during the next decade. It  is maintained 
that  it  is  extremely unlikely that  the  price of oil in the  mid-1990s will be below 
its current  level in real terms and that  a price range of, say, $20-25/bbl would 
not be  sustainable in the  longer run  in any case. 
COMMENTS: The global outlook represents  only a shor t  commentary (the f i r s t  
chapter  in a voluminous repor t )  on the  energy prospects and financing require- 
ments in developing countries. The analysis of oil prices is  very brief and 
represents  the  "common wisdom" of softer  prospects in the  shor t  run  and 
increasing real prices in the  long run. 
STUDY NAME: The A-ice of Crude Can be Controlled by the Cost of Methanol 
REFERENCE: R.J. Deam and C. Giesecke, Programme Group on Systems Research 
and Technological Development, Jiilich Nuclear Research Centre (KFA), April 
1983 [IS]. 
APPEtOACH: A somewhat extreme scenario is described to demonstrate the poten- 
tial usefulness of a particular technology (i.e., the methanol route). 
(a) Methodology: Hand calculations, supported by a large linear programming 
model with a price-elastic demand function. (A model description was published 
in 1976.) 
(b) h e  Yeac 1983 
(c) Assumptions: Methanol wil l  be available in large quantities at total FOB 
costs of $SZ/t if produced from natural gas o r  a t  S135/t if produced from coal. 
The end-use technologies fo r  methanol w i l l  be available. 
(d) ResuLis: Crude oil prices can be limited to $10-lZ/bbl in red terms for  
more than 40 yeam and to $24/bbl for  at least another 40 years. Governments 
of oil conswning countries could (by proper taxation) reduoe the producer 
price to even S4/bbl. 
HAIN OBJECl'lVE: To increase the number of options being considered by describ- 
ing an "unconventional" s y s t e m  of Liquid fuel supply, which could be highly com- 
petitive if there existed an appropriate infrastrncture and if the raw materials 
for  the methanol production (primarily natural gas) w e r e  available a t  prices 
that do not include a high profit margin. 
SPAT'KAL AND TEMPORAL COVER Global, next 80 yeam. 
PBET OF ENERGY SYSTEY CONSIDEBED: Mainly liquid and gaseous fuels (also 
f r o m  coal). Consequences described in all main parts of the energy system. 
PRICE PBOJECPIONS: Maximum crude oil price $10-12/bbl for  more than 40 yeam, 
thereafter $24/bbl f o r  at least another 40 ysars. During the shift period OPEC 
wi l l  go to maximum production. 
COMMENTS: A target scenario is described, the Likelihood of which is not dis- 
cussed. A path to the target is not described either. Nevertheless, the study 
marks a characteristic point in the set of cJL possibilities. 
STUDY N m :  Gas Research Ins t i tu te  Baseline Projection of US Energy Supp ly  
and  Damand, 2980-2000 
ABBREVIATION: GRI (GRI) 
REFERENCE: Prepared by T.J. Woods, R.H. Holt, J.T. Rasmussen, D.A. Dreyfus. 
Gas Research Institute (GRI), January 1982 and October 1982. [19]. 
APPROACH: Economic and energy modeling supplemented by judgmental considera- 
tions. 
(a) Methodology: A macroeconomic model by DRI (Data Resources Inc.) to gen- 
erate a detailed economic projection; a second (modified) DRI model to develop 
a preliminary energy projection; and an EEA (Energy and Environmental 
Analysis Inc.) model to study the  industrial sector fuel demand. Preliminary 
model results w e r e  finalized through some iterations of judgmental modifica- 
tions (e.g., f o r  macroeconomic effects of economic growth assumptions and sec- 
toral  energy demand as a function of macroeconomic indicators). 
(b) Base Year: 1982. 
(c) Assumptions: GNP growth and major fuel prices; no technological break- 
through is  assumed. Also, a cost-based determination of natural gas prices in a 
free market is assumed. 
(d) Results: Consistent and "comprehensive baseline projection of future 
energy supply and demand" with price projections of gaseous fuels. 
IIIEBEN OBJECTIVE: To provide a baseline from which the  potential impacts of GRI's 
research and development program can be evaluated. 
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL COYER- The United States; 1980 t o  2000. 
PART OF ENERGY SYSTEM CONSIDERED: Primary energy with emphasis on gas 
supply and demand. Prices, production, and import of various gaseous fuels 
are also considered in g rea te r  detail. 
PEICE PROJECTIONS: Crude oil pr ice  assumptions result in a price of $43/bbl 
(1980 dollars) in 2000. GNP growth is 1.85% p e r  yea r  for the  US. These values 
represent  rough averages of the  January and October reports.  
COMMENTS: The oil price i s  not the  focus of the  work described. However, i t  is  a 
crucial parameter fo r  the results obtained. 
STUDY NAME: World Energy Outlook b y  the International Energy Agency 
ABBREVIATION: IEA (IEA) 
REFERENCE: International Energy Agency, OECD, Paris,  1982 1203. 
APPROACH: Global oil demand and supply are estimated to assess the  vulnerability 
of OECD economies to oil supply disruptions. 
(a) Methodology: Econometric energy demand models are used t o  derive 
demand for major end-use sectors. Judgmental projections of future energy 
supply. 
@) h e  Year: 1980. 
(c) Assumptions: Two main scenarios; one with a constant real oil price, and 
one with a higher oil price and a lower demand. 
(d) Results: 'Tight" oil markets a f t e r  the  mid-1980s; energy demand in 2000 
much lower than 1979 projections. 
HAIN OBJECTIYE: To assist OECD governments in the i r  role of minimizing the  dam- 
age of hypothetical oil supply disruptions. 
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL COYER- World, 1980-2000; policy conclusions fo r  OECD 
countries. 
PART OF ENERGY SYSTEM CONSIDERED: Energy chain from primary t o  final 
energy with an emphasis on primary energy. 
PEUCE PROJECTIONS: An oil price of $28-45/bbl (1981 dollars) in 2000. 
COMMF,NTS: The IEA does not project consistent scenarios but leaves gaps between 
oil demand and supply. 
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